In Experiment 1, 36 subjects were exposed to a stimulus equivalence procedure during which they were trained to match the two nonsense syllables VEK and ZID to the emotive words CANCER and HOLIDAYS, respectively, and to match the product labels BRAND X and BRAND Y to the nonsense syllables. The subjects were then tested for equivalence responding (e.g., CANCER --. BRAND X, and HOLIDAYS ~ BRAND V). Finally subjects were presented with two samples of the same cola-based drink, one labeled BRAND X and the other labeled BRAND Y. Subjects were required to rate the colas for pleasantness. A significant difference in terms of the ratings of the pleasantness of the colas was found for the group who passed the equivalence test. The group of subjects who failed the equivalence test showed no significant difference in their ratings of the colas. Experiment 2 demonstrated that exposure to the equivalence test was not a prerequisite for the transfer of preference functions. Experiment 3 demonstrated that it is possible to reverse subjects' preferences for the two colas by reversing the trained conditional discriminations. Furthermore, unlike the previous two experiments, Experiment 3 assessed the preference functions for the emotive words before and after the conditional discrimination training and transfer testing.
that predicted pleasant music were significantly greater than preferences for stimuli that predicted the absence of music.
A relatively earlier but related study by Staats and Staats (1957) showed that subjects' responses to a semantic differential scale (pleasantness versus unpleasantness) were significantly modified by pairing nonsense syllables with either positive or negative words. For example, words such as pretty, healthy, sweet, sick, stupid, and disgusting were used. When the nonsense syllables were paired with negative words (e.g., sick, stupid, disgusting), the subjects came to evaluate the nonsense syllables as relatively unpleasant. Conversely, when the nonsense syllables were paired with positive words (e.g., pretty, sweet, healthy), the subjects came to evaluate the nonsense syllables as more pleasant. It is important to note that this effect, at least in theory, required what is sometimes called second-order respondent conditioning (see Catania, 1998) . That is, presumably the positive and negative functions of words such as pretty and sick had already been respondently conditioned by the verbal community prior to the subjects' participation in the Staats and Staats study. For example, the word "sick" (a conditional stimulus or CS) may have been directly paired with the consumption of salt water (an unconditional stimulus or US) that produced nausea and vomiting (an unconditional response or UR). For example, as a child the subject may have been told to "drink this" (a glass of salt water) to make him or her "sick" (Le., to regurgitate some poisonous berries). Subsequently, during the study the previously respondently conditioned functions of the word "sick" were then conditioned to a nonsense syllable (see Figure 1 ). In summary, a CS ("sick") had been previously paired with a US (salt water) that produced a UR (nausea and vomiting), and then that CS was paired with a second CS, such as YOF (Le., CS1 . -. US -. UR, followed by CS2 -. CS1 produced a respondently conditioned dislike of CS2). This use of second order respondent conditioning to manipulate subjects' preferences was replicated by demonstrating conditioning to nonsense syllables by using famous and infamous names rather than positive and negative words as socially established conditioned stimuli (Blandford & Sampson, 1964) .
Respondent conditioning procedures using verbal stimuli similar to those outlined above have also been used to modify the "maladaptive" associative histories of particular clinical populations. For example, Tryon and Briones (1985) used a respondent procedure to modify the culturally conditioned negative responses of a group of Filipino women to phrases describing heterosexual behaviors. Similar procedures have also been used to discourage children's cigarette, alcohol, and drug use (Moore, Moore, & Hauck, 1982) , to reduce children's test anxiety (Parish, Buntman, & Buntman, 1976) , and to ' reduce racial prejudice (Parish, Shirazi, & Lambert, 1976) .
Much remains, however, to be learned about the parameters within which respondent conditioning procedures will operate. One important parameter is the possible existence of boundary conditions on this procedure. As outlined previously, it has been shown that respondent conditioning is effective in establishing a particular function for one . Schematic representation of how the psychological functions of physical sickness (UR) produced by salt water (US) become respondently conditioned, by the verbal community, to the word "Sick" (CS1), and how these conditioned functions are then respondently conditioned, in the behavioral laboratory, to the nonsense syllable YOF (CS2). The end result is th~t YOF acquires some of the psychological functions of actual sickness via second order respondent conditioning. .
previously neutral nonsense syllable (Le., second-order conditioning). Tryon and Cicero (1989) , however, attempted to extend this process using third-order verbal respondent conditioning. This involved attempting to respondently condition a nonsense syllable, CS2, to a socially established emotive word, CS1, and then attempting to respondently condition a further nonsense syllable, CS3, to the CS2 (i.e., CS2 ~ CS1 followed by CS3 ~ CS2). Conditioning did occur to the CS2, thus replicating the findings of Staats and Staats (1957) . Conditioning via the third-order arrangement did not transfer, however, to the second contiguously presented nonsense syllable (CS3). The same researchers also used a different respondent conditioning procedure in another study (Cicero & Tryon, 1989) , in a further attempt to extend conditioning to a third-order CS by means of a sequential or triplet association (CS3 ~ CS2 ~ CS1). Again, conditioning did occur to the first nonsense syllable, CS2, but did not extend to the second nonsense syllable, CS3.
These failures to produce third-order, respondent conditioning are interesting because such conditioning has been demonstrated in experiments in which nonverbal stimuli are used (see Hall, 1986) . This fact suggests that third-order conditioning of preference functions may well be possible if the appropriate experimental procedures were employed. One way in which we might proceed is to employ a procedure that was originally designed, and has often been used, in the analysis of human verbal behavior (e.g., Barnes, Browne, Smeets, & Roche, 1995; Barnes, McCullagh, & Keenan, 1990; Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986; Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby, 1982) . This procedure, known as stimulus equivalence training and testing (see Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, in press; Sidman, 1994) , is quite complex and will, therefore, be described in detail before discussing how it may be used to study the transfer of function in human adult subjects.
In a typical stimulus equivalence experiment, a matching-to-sample procedure is normally used. On each trial of this procedure a sample stimulus is presented with two or more comparison stimuli, and the subject is trained to choose a particular comparison in the presence of a particular sample (e.g., a point is awarded if the correct comparison is chosen, but a point is deducted if an incorrect comparison is selected). The stimuli used in equivalence research are usually abstract shapes or nonsense syllables, and they bear no consistent physical relationship to each other. Subjects thus have to learn which comparisons go with which samples through a process of trial and error (Le., no formal rule applies, such as pick the comparison that looks most like the sample). Once a subject has learned all of the conditional relations, a test for equivalence responding may be introduced. For illustrative purposes, imagine that a person is trained to select the comparison stimulus B in the presence of the sample stimulus A and is then trained in a similar manner to select another stimulus C in the presence of stimulus B. Following this explicit training, it is likely that during an equivalence test the subject will, without further training or instruction, respond in accordance with the transitive relation given A select C, and the combined symmetry and transitivity relation given C select A. Responding in accordance with symmetry and transitivity, in a matching-to-sample context, is normally accepted as evidence that the three stimuli (A, B, C) participate in an equivalence relation (e.g., Barnes & Holmes, 1991) .
Researchers have also shown that when a particular psycholOgical function is explicitly established for one stimulus that participates in an equivalence relation, the same function may then transfer to the other stimuli participating in the relation without further training (e.g., Barnes & Keenan, 1993; Roche & Barnes, 1997) . In Experiment 1 of the study conducted by Roche and Barnes, for example, adult subjects were trained in the following conditional discrimination tasks: If sample A 1, select comparison 81 and not B2; if A2, select B2 and not B1; if B1 select C1 and not C2; if B2 select C2 and not C1. The subjects subsequently responded in accordance with two equivalence relations (e.g., if C1 select A1 and not A2; if C2 select A2 and not A1). A stimulus from each equivalence relation was then given a distinct, respondently conditioned function; C1 was paired with the presentation of sexually explicit video material, and C2 was paired with video material taken from nature documentaries. During testing, A 1 produced significantly greater electrodermal activity than did A2. In effect, the differential arousal functions established for C1 and C2 transferred via equivalence relations to the A 1 and A2 stimuli in the absence of explicit reinforcement or stimulus pairings (see Figure 2) .
Interestingly, the transfer of function effect via equivalence relations may provide a means of establishing preference functions in nonsense Figure 2 . Schematic representation of the training and testing tasks used by Roche and Barnes (1997) . Subjects were exposed to conditional discrimination training, equivalence testing, respondent conditioning, and transfer of function testing. A "+" indicates the reinforced comparison during conditional discrimination training, and "+?" indicates the equivalent comparison during equivalence testing.
syllables that would be designated as CS3s in the respondent conditioning paradigm. Consider the following hypothetical experiment. A presumed, previously established negative word, CANCER (CS1), is trained as a sample stimulus for conditional responses to the neutral nonsense syllable, VEK (CS2), and VEK is also trained as a sample stimulus for conditional responses towards a product brand name, BRAND X (CS3) (Le., CANCER -. VEK -. BRAND X). In a similar fashion HOLIDAYS (CS1) is related to ZID (CS2) and ZID related to BRAND Y (CS3). Having been trained in these conditional relations, subjects could then be tested for equivalence responding (e.g., BRAND X -. CANCER, and BRAND Y -. HOLIDAYS). Subsequently, the subjects could be asked to evaluate, in terms of pleasantness, samples of the supposedly different products (BRAND X and BRAND Y), both of which are in fact the same brand. In the event of subjects showing a significant preference for the product that participated in equivalence relations with holidays over the "cancer" product, we would have evidence that the psychologically emotive functions of the positive and negative words had transferred via the equivalence classes to the product brand names.
The key issue we wished to address at this point was as follows. As outlined earlier, respondent conditioning of words with positive and negative functions have been used to change subjects' evaluations of neutral stimuli (Staats & Staats, 1957) , but after the process was extended to third-order conditioning, results were not successful (Cicero & Tyron, 1989; Tyron & Cicero, 1989) . Will a transfer of functions across three stimuli occur, however, if a stimulus equivalence procedure, like that outlined in the previous paragraph, is used instead of a respondent conditioning procedure? Experiment 1 of the current study was designed to answer this question. In the interests of clarity, Experiments 2 and 3 will be outlined subsequently.
Experiment 1

Method Subjects
Participants were 38 undergraduates, 30 males and 8 females, all attending University College, Cork. Their ages ranged from 18 to 25 years. All subjects were recruited through personal contacts and were nonpsychology majors, and they were not familiar with stimulus equivalence nor any related phenomenon.
Apparatus
Each subject was seated in 'the experimental room with an Apple Macintosh Classic II© microcomputer which displayed black characters on a white background. Stimulus presentations and the recording of responses were controlled by the computer which was programmed in BBC BASIC. The keys Z and M on the keyboard were marked with red tape to designate them as response keys.
Procedure
The experimental sequence was divided into three stages: (a) training, (b) testing, and (c) rating. Each subject was trained, tested, and rated individually.
(a) Training. Each experimental subject was trained on four matching-tosample tasks of the following types: CANCER --. VEK; VEK --. BRAND X; HOLIDAYS --. liD; liD --. BRAND Y (see Figure 3) . The nonsense syllables, VEK and liD, and the brand names, Brand X and Brand Y, were counterbalanced across subjects, but for ease of exposition the configuration of the stimuli shown in Figure 3 will be used throughout to describe both the procedure and results. Training proceeded as follows. The subject was seated at the computer and the following text appeared on the screen.
During the first stage of the experiment you must look at the nonsense syllable at the top, and then choose one of the two words or phrases at the bottom by pressing one of the marked keys on the keyboard. To choose the left word/phrase, press the marked key on the left. To choose the right word/phrase press the marked key on the right.
After the subject pressed the space bar, one of the four matching-tosample tasks was presented. In effect, a sample stimulus (e.g., CANCER) was presented for 2 s, the screen then cleared for 0.5 s, and two comparison stimuli (Le., VEK and liD) were presented. To choose the comparison on the left of the screen, the subject pressed l (the marked key on the left side of the keyboard). To choose the comparison on the right of the screen, the subject pressed M (the marked key on the right of the keyboard). If the subject's choice was defined as correct, the screen cleared and the word "CORRECT' appeared on the screen for 1.5 s, accompanied by a high pitched tone. If the subject made an incorrect choice, the screen cleared and the word 'WRONG" appeared on the screen for 1.5 s, accompanied by a low pitched tone. After the feedback, a 2-s intertrial interval was presented during which the screen remained blank, and no sounds were emitted by the computer. The four matching-to-sample tasks were presented in this way, in a quasi-random order (each task presented once in each block of four trials), until 24 consecutively correct responses were emitted by the subject. When the subject reached this criterion, the training stage ended.
(b) Testing. The testing stage began immediately, and without warning, after the end of the training stage for each subject. The testing stage involved 20 matching-to-sample trials in which each of the four equivalence tasks (see Figure 3 lower section) were presented five times in a quasi-random order (Le., each of the four tasks were presented once in every block of four trials). No feedback was given after any test trial (Le., when a subject made a response, the computer proceeded directly to the intertrial interval). Subjects who matched in accordance with the equivalence relations on 17 or more of these 20 trials (85 % +) were deemed to have passed the equivalence test. Subjects with less than 17 correct were deemed to have failed the equivalence test. Brand Y Cola -Pleasantness Rating1 (1-7) Figure 3 . Schematic representation of the training and testing tasks used in the current study. Subjects were exposed to conditional discrimination training, equivalence testing, and a pleasantness rating test. A "+" indicates the reinforced comparison during conditional discrimination training, and "+ ?" indicates the equivalent comparison during equivalence testing.
(e) Rating. The rating stage took place immediately after the testing stage for each individual subject. In the ratings of the colas for pleasantness, the subject was seated at a table in the experimental room.
The experimenter presented, on the table, a tray containing the following: on the left side of the tray was a 1 .25-liter bottle of cola labeled Brand X, and a glass, and on the right side of the tray was an identical 1 .25-liter bottle of cola labeled Brand Y, and a glass. The colas presented as BRAND X and BRAND Y were, in fact, the same. They ·consisted of 75% Coca-Cola and 25% Kerry Spring Pear Scented Water. The experimenter provided the subject with a rating sheet and instructed the subject to taste both colas, Brand X and Brand Y (the order of tasting across subjects was counterbalanced), and then rate both colas for pleasantness on a scale of 1 to 7. Specifically, subjects were asked to rate the colas in terms of pleasantness with a maximum score of 7 (most pleasant) and a minimum score of 1 (least pleasant). Subjects were then thanked for their participation and were informed that they would be fully debriefed when the entire study was completed. This was duly done.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 presents the rating scores for those 27 subjects who successfully passed the equivalence test (Le., 85% or more correct). The rating scores for those 9 subjects who failed the equivalence test are presented in Figure 5 . In the group of 27 subjects who passed the equivalence test, 16 subjects rated the cola that had a label in an equivalence class with holidays (hereafter referred to as the holidayscola) higher than the coll a that had a label in an equivalence class with cancer (hereafter referred to as the cancer-cola); 4 subjects rated the cancer-cola higher than the holidays-cola; and 7 subjects rated both colas at the same level. In the group of 9 subjects who failed the equivalence test, 4 subjects rated the holidays-cola higher than the cancer-cola; 2 subjects rated the cancer-cola higher than the holidays-cola; and 3 subjects rated both colas as equally pleasant. A Wilcoxin Matched Pairs Signed Ranks Test showed that the equivalence-pass group had a significant preference (p < .05) for the holidays-cola over the cancer-cola.
A further Wilcoxin Test showed that there was no significant difference (p > .05) between subjects ratings of the two colas for the group of 9 subjects who failed the equivalence test.
The results suggest that the stimulus equivalence procedure is an effective method by which preference functions can be transferred to a third order. However, it could be argued that this transfer of function to a third order was facilitated, not by the matching-to-sample training alone, but also by the subsequent test for equivalence during which the stimuli, which could be considered CS 1 sand CS3s (in a classical conditioning procedure), were presented contiguously on the screen (Le., the sample stimulus was presented for 2 s followed by a clear screen for 0.5 s, and the subsequent presentation of the equivalent, and nonequivalent, comparison stimuli). In consideration of this possibility, a subsequent experiment was undertaken. 
Method Subjects
Participants were 8 experimentally naive subjects, 6 male and 2 female, all attending University College, Cork. Their ages ranged from 19 to 24 years. All subjects were recruited through personal contacts and were not familiar with stimulus equivalence or any related phenomenon.
Apparatus
The apparatus used in Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 1 .
Procedure
The experimental sequence was divided into two stages: (a) training and (b) rating. The training section was exactly the same as in Experiment 1 and the ratings of the pleasantness of the colas was also the same as in Experiment 1. However, this experiment did not include an equivalence testing stage. That is, subjects proceeded directly from the conditional discrimination training to the cola rating stage of the experiment. Figure 6 shows the ratings of subjects in Experiment 2. Of the 8 subjects, 6 rated the holidays-cola as more pleasant than the cancer-cola and 2 subjects rated the cancer-cola as more pleasant than the holidayscola. A Wilcoxin Matched Pairs Signed Ranks Test indicated a significant (p < .05) preference for the holidays-cola over the cancer-cola. This result suggests that the test for equivalence in Experiment 1 was not necessary for the transfer of preference function to a third order by means of a stimulus equivalence procedure.
Results and Discussion
. One possible criticism of the previous two experiments might be that the subjects could have shown the preferences they did without conditional discrimination training. Although we attempted to control for / preexisting preferences by using the same mix of soft drinks for both the cancer and holidays colas (i.e., 75% Coca Cola with 25% Kerry Spring Pear Scented Water), it is still possible that subjects would have shown a bias in the absence of the training. Experiment 3 was designed to address this and other possible criticisms of the previous two experiments.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2, but a number of control measures and procedures were included in order to determine whether the conditional discrimination training was clearly influencing the pleasantness ratings of the colas. First, subjects were required to rate the two colas before the conditional discrimination tr~ining so that these ratings could be compared to the ratings taken after the training. Second, the subjects were required, before and after the experiment, to rate the words "Cancer" and "Holidays" as emotionally negative or positive, so that these ratings could be compared to the pleasantness ratings obtained for the colas. Third, after the subjects had completed the conditional discrimination training and pleasantness ratings, they were reexposed to these training and testing procedures except that the labels, Brand X and Brand Y were reversed within the training (e.g., if Brand X had participated in an equivalence class with "Holidays" during the first exposure, it should now participate in a class with "Cancer"). If this second exposure to the training was followed by a reversal .in the pleasantness ratings obtained during the first exposure, this would constitute an extremely robust test for the effects of the conditional discrimination training on the pleasantness ratings.
Method Subjects
Participants were 6 experimentally naive subjects, 3 male and 3 female, all attending University College, Cork. Their ages ranged from 18 to 21 years. All subjects were recruited through personal contacts and were not familiar with stimulus equivalence or any related phenomenon.
Apparatus
The apparatus used in Experiment 3 was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure
The experimental sequence was divided into seven stages; (a) testing the emotional ratings of the words, "Cancer" and "Holidays," (b) pretesting the pleasantness ratings of the two colas, (c) conditional discrimination training, (d) retesting the pleasantness ratings of the colas, (e) retraining the conditional discriminations, but with the labels Brand X and Brand Y switching their respective positions within those discriminations, (f) retesting the pl, easantness ratings, and (g) retesting the emotional ratings of the words, "Cancer" and "Holidays."
The conditional discrimination training procedure and the cola pleasantness ratings were conducted in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2 (like Experiment 2, no equivalence tests were presented to the subjects). Emotional ratings for the words "Cancer" and "Holidays" were obtained using a 7-point scale. Each subject was presented with two sheets (one for each word) requesting that the words be rated in terms of the subject's own emotional reaction to the words, with a maximum score of 7 (most positive emotional reaction) and a minimum score of 1 (most negative emotional reaction). The order in which the two words were presented was counterbalanced across subjects and across the two exposures to this rating task. Table 1 presents the subjects' emotional ratings of the words "Cancer" and "Holidays:' Of the subjects, 3 (45, 48, & 49) changed their ratings between the beginning and the end of the experiment, but only by 1 point, and overall the different ratings of the two words remained highly stable. Subjects 45 to 48 all rated the word "Cancer" as having a negative emotional impact and the word "Holidays" as having a positive emotional impact. Subjects 49 and 50, however, showed the opposite pattern. When these subjects were debriefed at the end of the study, it transpired that they were both born under the star sign Cancer, and during the experiment they had interpreted the word in this way (Le., as referring to the subject's own star sign). Furthermore, both of these subjects also reported that they had recently experienced highly unpleasant vacations (one through illness and the other through the death of a family member). These "idiosyncratic" interpretations of the two words were not reported by any of the 4 remaining subjects (Le., they interpreted "Cancer" to mean a life-threatening disease and "Holidays" to mean an enjoyable experience).
Results and Discussion
The results of each subject's three separate exposures to the pleasantness rating procedure are shown in Figure 7 . For the first exposure to this procedure (pretest ratings), 2 subjects (47 & 48) showed no differences in their ratings of the two colas. The remaining 4 subjects reported differences, but only by 1 point (e.g., Subject 45 rated the Brand Table 1 Emotional Impact Ratings of the Words "Cancer" and "Holidays" for Subjects in Experiment 3 X cola 4 and the Brand Y cola 3}. Following the conditional discrimination training, however, all 6 subjects' pleasantness ratings changed dramatically (transfer test). For Subjects 45 to 48, the pleasantness ratings of the cancer-cola decreased, and the holidays-cola increased, relative to the pretest ratings. The opposite pattern was observed for Subjects 49 and 50. The preference ratings then reversed for all subjects after the labels Brand X and Brand Y had been switched during the second exposure to the conditional discrimination training (reversal test). Interestingly, this pattern of preference ratings is entirely consistent with the subjects' emotional reactions to the words "Cancer" and "Holidays." If a subject reported negative and positive emotional reactions to "Cancer" and "Holidays," respectively, the cancer-cola was rated lower on the preference scale than the holidays-cola, but if "Cancer" and "Holidays" were rated positively and negatively, respectively, the cancercola was rated higher on the preference scale than the holidays-cola.
Overall, the results of Experiment 3, and particularly the results of the reversal test, provide strong evidence that the conditional discrimination training functioned as a powerful determinant of the subjects' preference ratings.
General Discussion
The main findings of the study were as follows. In Experiment 1, those subjects who passed the equivalence test rated the holidays-cola significantly more pleasant than the cancer-cola, and those subjects who failed the equivalence test showed no significant difference between their ratings of the holidays-cola and the cancer-cola. In Experiment 2, subjects were not tested for equivalence and they rated the holidays-cola significantly more pleasant than the cancer-cola. In Experiment 3, preexperimental and postexperimental ratings of the words "Cancer" and "Holidays," and the use of a pretest and a reversal procedure, demonstrated that the preference ratings of the colas was strongly influenced by the conditional discrimination training.
The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that the stimulus equivalence procedure is an effective means of transferring a conditioned stimulus function from a CS1 (socially established emotive word) via a CS2 (nonsense syllable) to a CS3 (brand name). The findings of Experiment 2 suggest that the equivalence testing phase is not necessary in order for this transfer to occur. And the various control measures and procedures employed in Experiment 3 provide the strongest evidence of all for the derived transfer of emotive functions.
One possible criticism of the current study is that subjects may have realized what the research was attempting to achieve, and thus the preference ratings simply reflected the subjects' tendencies to please the experimenter (see Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Insko, Drenan, Salmon, Smith, & Wade, 1982; Insko, Sedlak, & Lipsitz, 1982;  for evidence that shows this may occur in psychology experiments). However, the same criticism could be applied to the studies reported by Cicero and Tyron (1989) and Tyron and Cicero (1989) , both of which attempted to extend conditioning to a third order. Yet, in these studies attempts to condition to a third order failed. Thus, other factors, apart from subjects' social compliance, were likely involved in producing the transfer of preference functions seen in the current study.
Another factor that may have influenced subjects' ratings was the presentation of the colas. Both colas were presented simultaneously on the tray and thus the presence of one brand may have affected the subjects' ratings of the other brand. For instance, while students evaluated the brand conditioned to the positive emotive word, the presence on the tray of the brand conditioned to the negative emotive word may have served to "artificially" increase the subjects' ratings. In this regard, Sutton and Barto (1981) claimed that, in relation to any evaluation of the effectiveness of classical conditioning, context stimuli can have such large effects on associative strength that they cannot satisfactorily be ignored. Furthermore, Cohen (1982) argued that the presence of the other brand can be thought of as providing subjects with a cognitive context or comparison standard against which to judge the CS brand, thereby influencing how the CS brand is interpreted and evaluated. In future studies, therefore, the presentation and rating of the colas separately may control for this possible effect. Once again, however, it is important to note that Cicero and Tyron (1989) and Tyron and Cicero (1989) failed to condition preferences to a third order even though the two stimuli were present.
In Experiment 1, of the 27 subjects who showed equivalence, 16 subjects (59.30/0) showed transfer of emotive function (preferred the holidays-cola), 6 subjects (22%) did not indicate a preference, and 4 subjects (14.8%) showed a preference for the cancer-cola. In Experiment 2, equivalence was not tested, and yet of the 8 subjects in this experiment, 6 subjects (75%) showed a transfer of emotive function (preferred the holidays-cola) and 2 subjects (25%) showed a preference for the cancercola. The paradox of an apparently superior performance by a group of subjects who had not been tested for equivalence responding might be explained as follows. The additional period of repetitive exposures to the emotive words in the testing phase in Experiment 1, ·relative to Experiment 2 (with no test phase), may have increased any habituation that occurred for the emotive functions of the words, cancer and holidays. Consequently, subjects in Experiment 2 may have shown greater transfer of emotive functions because of a lower level of habituation. The strong transfer effects observed in Experiment 3 (which also did not employ an equivalence test) lends further support to this suggestion.
The preference data for subjects in the fail-equivalence group are also of interest. Whereas the percentage of subjects who failed the equivalence test and still showed transfer of emotive function (44%) was lower than the percentage of subjects who passed the equivalence test and showed transfer (59%), this percentage of nonequivalence subjects was higher than the proportions of nonequivalence subjects rating both colas the same (33.3%) or preferring the cancer-cola (22.2%). In effect, the preferences of those subjects who failed the equivalence test still moved in the direction of the transfer. This outcome may be relevant to the common finding in equivalence research that equivalence responding often emerges across repeated test exposures without further training (e.g., Devany et aI., 1986) . The shift towards transfer after failing the equivalence test may constitute a similar effect insofar as the preference test represented a second type of equivalence testing (Hayes, Devany, Kohlenberg, Brownstein, & Shelby, 1987) . It is possible, therefore, that subjects in the fail-equivalence group in Experiment 1 , who moved in the direction of the transfer, would have eventually showed equivalence if testing was repeated.
A more general issue concerns the reason why some subjects in Experiment 1 failed to show transfer, even when they passed the prior equivalence test. One possible explanation might be that we the researchers only inferred that the psychological functions of the words "cancer" or "holidays" were negative and positive, respectively, and thus for some subjects the functions of these words may have in fact been either neutral or opposite to those predicted by the experimenters. For example, some subjects may have associated the word "cancer" with the pleasure of smoking or with a star sign and/or the word "holidays" with the unpleasant experience of a disappointing vacation. Certainly, the results of Experiment 3 support this interpretation.
Numerous questions are raised by the fact that the matching-tosample procedure employed in the current study generated a derived transfer of emotive functions to a third order, · whereas Cicero and Tyron (1989) and Tyron and Cicero (1989) failed to achieve this effect using two . different classical conditioning procedures. What variables are responsible for these two different outcomes? This is a particularly interesting question for our own research group, because we have recently developed a respondent-type training procedure that produces very consistent and highly reliable forms of derived stimulus control (e.g., . One direction for future research, therefore, would involve a systematic comparison of the procedures employed by Leader et al. (1996) and those of the current study. Indeed, this and related research is currently underway in our laboratories.
